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The Influence of Newer Member States in the 5 











This article seeks to examine and assess the role of Poland in the early stage making of the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) of the European Union (EU).  First, it briefly reviews Poland’s aims and ambitions 
with regard to the European Union’s policy towards its eastern neighbours, both before and since it 
joined the European Union in 2004. Second, it describes and analyses the EaP, including its added 20 
value for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Third, it draws on a range of interviews carried 
out by the authors in Brussels and Warsaw on Poland’s role in the initial formation of the EaP, as seen 
by its partners in the other Member States and European institutions. In addition, it seeks to unpack 
some of the early stage lessons learnt by the Polish government about how best to achieve its ambitions 
in the EU, and notes the remaining weaknesses of the Polish administration, particularly in the area of 25 
administrative capacity.  
 
 
THIS ARTICLE SEEKS TO EXAMINE AND ASSESS THE ROLE OF POLAND 
during the initial establishment phase of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) of the 30 
European Union (EU), as viewed by key EU and Polish political elites. The EaP was 
jointly launched by Poland and Sweden in 2008 as a means of reinforcing the eastern 
dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The article contributes 
primarily to the growing body of scholarship on the impact and influence of newer 
Member States of the European Union as unlikely power brokers on its policy agenda 35 
(see, for example, Dangerfield 2010). The article also contributes to the study of the 
EU’s role in its eastern neighbourhood and provides new empirical evidence on the 
formulation and negotiation of the EaP (Dannreuther 2004; Emerson 2004; Emerson 
et al. 2007; Kelley 2006; Schimmelfennig & Scholz 2008; Smith 2005; Weber et al. 
2007; Bechev & Nicolaidis 2010; Whitman and Wolff 2010a). The original interview 40 
material on which this article is based was largely gathered between 2007 and 2010, 
and as such deals with the stage leading up to the creation of the Eastern Partnership 
in 2008 and its initial period of functioning. Subsequent developments are not 
considered.  
This article draws upon the authors’ earlier work (Copsey & Pomorska 2010) that 45 
established a framework for evaluating the capacity of Member States to exercise 
Lukes’ (2005) second dimension of ‘power’, or rather ‘influence’, in the European 
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Union, which was then applied to Poland as a case study.1 The article returns to the 
question of how power and influence is exercised in the EU by the Member States in 
the conclusion. Our previous article argued that Poland’s influence in the first few 50 
years of EU membership had been low. This earlier study concentrated on the 
domestic sources of Polish European policy, and looked mainly, although not 
exclusively, at Poland’s efforts in the European Union through the eyes of civil 
servants, politicians, private sector analysts and various lobbyists based in Warsaw. 
The focus of this article is on what might be termed a ‘peer review’ of Polish 55 
performance within the European Union, and specifically in the field of its eastern 
policy. To achieve this, the article draws principally on a series of 55 interviews 
conducted by the authors in Brussels and Warsaw with diplomats from the Permanent 
Representations of 10 Member States, as well as with officials from the European 
Commission, the Council Secretariat General, Members of the European Parliament 60 
(MEPs) and a selection of independent policy analysts.2 
The article is primarily empirical in its approach, but it also builds on the 
framework put forward in the authors’ earlier article (Copsey & Pomorska 2010) for 
assessing the influence of Member States on a given policy domain. The capacity of 
individual Member States to exercise influence within the EU on the making of a 65 
particular policy remains a much under-researched area of academic enquiry even 
though it is an issue of profound importance (see Bulmer & Lequesne 2002). Scholars 
have tended to shy away from this question because it is extremely hard to ‘measure’ 
or evaluate power or influence.  In terms of previous attempts to investigate this 
matter, there is the grand theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism put forward by 70 
Moravcsik (1998), as well as the work of Tallberg (2008), Wallace et al. (2005) and 
our own modest contribution to this area of enquiry (Copsey & Pomorska 2010). 
However, all of these theories share the age-old social scientist’s dilemma of 
establishing causality between a given action and a particular outcome. Moreover, 
published literature on the policy preferences of the 12 post-2004 Member States, let 75 
alone their capacity or desire to upload these items onto the European Union agenda 
has been somewhat limited, particularly with regard to the first years of membership. 
This was due to firstly the relatively short period of time that has elapsed between 
their accession and the time when our interviews ended in 2010, (see Copsey & 
Haughton 2009) and secondly, to the fact that many of the smaller newer Member 80 
States (and the majority are rather small) have expressed no explicit desire to be 
influential in the Union. Poland is an important exception to this (Copsey & Pomorska 
2010) and has made its wish to be a policy-maker as well as a policy-taker explicit, 
which is why our study focuses on this state.   
The difficulties and complexities that are inherent in researching the influence of 85 
individual Member States on the European policy agenda are no excuse for avoiding 
the question altogether. Rather we argue that scholars should proceed with small steps 
towards the aim of developing a sounder theoretical base for assessing the influence 
of Member States. Empirical studies such as this article should help guide future 
theorists. In this article we focus on perceptions of the influence of Poland on the EU 90 
                                                        
1 Lukes’ second dimension of power is the ability to exercise influence, persuasion and coercion to 
secure a particular outcome, where there is a conflict of subjective interests (Lukes 2005, pp. 20–25). 
2 Fifty-five semi-structured interviews were conducted during the project between 2007 and 2010 in 
Warsaw and Brussels and the data was subsequently transcribed and coded. Interview transcripts have 
been anonymised to protect the identity of the interviewees. In this article, each interview has been 
numbered by the authors, giving the date and place of the interview. A full list of interviews was 
disclosed to the editors and peer-reviewers.  
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agenda (what Europeanisation scholars call ‘uploading’).  The perceptions are those 
of the officials involved in the policy-making process, predominantly based in the 
European Commission’s DG-RELEX or Permanent Representations of the Member 
States to the EU. The authors freely acknowledge that influence and perceived 
influence are not the same thing, but would reiterate that if a Member State wishes to 95 
be influential in the European Union, a necessary, though not sufficient, condition is 
that it needs the good opinion of its peers. Consequently the perceptions of both 
officials from other Member States and officials from the EU institutions are of great 
importance.  
The structure of the article is as follows. Section One briefly reviews Poland’s 100 
aims and ambitions with regard to the European Union’s policy towards its eastern 
neighbours, both before and during the first years of its membership after 2004. 
Section Two describes and analyses the Eastern Partnership and its added value for 
the European Union’s Neighbourhood Policy. Section Three draws on the interviews 
carried out by the authors in Brussels and Warsaw in order to evaluate Poland’s 105 
ability to adapt quickly to the role of policy maker during the first 6 years of its 
membership and influence the making of the Eastern Partnership, as seen by other 
Member States and officials from the European institutions. In addition, the final 
section of the article unpacks the lessons learnt by the Polish government in the early 
years of its EU membership about how best to achieve its ambitions in the EU, and 110 
notes certain weaknesses of the Polish administration, particularly in the area of 
administrative capacity.  
 
 
Polish Policy Towards the Eastern Neighbours of the EU 1989–2008 115 
Relations with its Eastern neighbours were among the great challenges for modern 
Polish foreign policy, as formulated from 1990. Consequently, they became one of the 
top priorities for Polish diplomacy within the EU. Poland’s initial post-1989 policy 
choices were made in accordance with a series of concepts formulated in the 1960s by 
Juliusz Mieroszewski and Jerzy Giedroyc, both of whom advocated support for an 120 
independent Ukraine, and which were originally set out in the Paris-based émigré 
journal, Kultura. In 1989, the Polish political elite soon recognized that better 
relations with the Eastern neighbours could mean gaining a stronger position within 
Western Europe (Kupiecki & Szczepanik 1995, p. 75). After the initial ‘dual-track’ 
policy, designed as an attempt to maintain a balance between Moscow and the newly 125 
independent post-Soviet states, a new and more active policy approach was 
formulated in 1994 (Olechowski 1994). Its aim was to build good relations with the 
states of special significance for Poland: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, 
Kazakhstan and Moldova. Relations with Ukraine were characterized as a strategic 
partnership of crucial importance, which was later to be reflected in the role of Poland 130 
as an advocate for Ukraine’s closer ties with the EU (Buras & Pomorska 2006). 
Prior to the 2004 accession, the Polish government had already begun to lobby in 
favour of creating an independent ‘Eastern Dimension’ to EU relations with the 
countries to its east. In 2003, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) released a 
non-paper3 that outlined the main aims of the proposed policy (MFA 2003). The first 135 
objective was to enable East European partners, such as Ukraine and Moldova (but 
potentially also Belarus), to join the EU when they were willing to and when they 
                                                        
3 A non-paper (a term very commonly used in Brussels and in diplomatic jargon in general) is a 
document that is usually circulated informally between the Member States. 
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were ready and able to fulfil the membership criteria. Polish officials stressed that 
‘Europe does not end at the EU's Eastern borders, nor will it end there after 
enlargement’ (Cimoszewicz 2004) and did not hesitate to admit that ‘Poland is a 140 
strong advocate of the European aspirations expressed repeatedly by Ukraine and 
Moldova’ (Cimoszewicz 2004). This strategic goal essentially remained unchanged 
and represented the underlying long-term constant for Polish initiatives regarding the 
ENP.  What did change was Poland’s approach, which shifted to recognise the need 
for incremental steps to promoting its policy preferences for the eastern 145 
neighbourhood.  This was important because Poland’s promotion of Ukraine did not 
strike a chord with all EU Member States or institutions with some continuing to view 
the broad focus ENP as the primary means of engagement with Ukraine (Longhurst & 
Zaborowski 2007, p. 85).  In this respect, it appeared that Poland had failed to initially 
upload the idea of a specific Eastern dimension to the EU’s ENP.  The 2003 Polish 150 
non-paper, as admitted later by some Polish diplomats4 was not deemed pragmatic 
enough, because the Poles lacked valuable inside knowledge on how the EU 
functioned. 
There were identifiable differences between the emergent broad-based, inclusive 
ENP (which included the EU’s southern neighbours as well as its eastern ones) 155 
supported by old Member States such France and the Polish position on how the EU’s 
relations with the East should be structured. However, even though officials in the 
Polish MFA admitted that the ENP was ‘far from the ideal that was presented [by the 
UK] in 2002’5, the EU’s attempt to develop a ‘circle of friends’, including those on its 
Eastern borders was, in principle, welcomed by Warsaw. Poland also quickly 160 
recognised that adopting a pragmatic, ‘small-steps’ approach, would allow it to 
continue to push for incremental changes to the existing EU neighbourhood policy. At 
the same time, Poland continued to promote the issue of membership for Ukraine and 
other eastern neighbours, thus keeping it high on the ENP agenda. As one MFA 
official put it, the perspective of membership ‘worked in our case and is working for 165 
the Balkans’, therefore by implication, it should also work for the states beyond 
Poland’s and the EU’s eastern border.6 Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Meller 
referred to these states when he gave his annual address to the Polish parliament 
(Sejm) in January 2006:  
 170 
We will seek to ensure that the emerging Eastern Dimension of the Union’s Neighbourhood Policy 
draws the countries involved closer to the Union. At the same time, they should not be doomed to 
the role of “eternal partners”. At least some of them – the ones with a pro-European orientation and 
advanced internal transformations – should be given the prospect of membership, however distant 
it may be. (Meller 2006) 175 
 
In 2006, Polish Foreign Ministry diplomats presented a ‘food for thought’ 
document to the European Council (MFA 2006).  The document submitted in parallel 
to separate proposals from the German and Lithuanian governments, talked of both 
the ‘Eastern Dimension’ and future relations with Ukraine. It advocated 180 
acknowledging the strategic importance of EU–Ukraine relations, as well as the need 
for the swift conclusion of visa facilitation and readmission agreements, and the 
necessity to strengthen EU efforts to resolve frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus 
and Transnistria. 
                                                        
4 Interview 46, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 10 May 2005; Interview 23, UK Embassy, 
Warsaw, 20 October 2005. 
5 Interview 46, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 10 May 2005. 
6 Interview 46, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 10 May 2005. 
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The opportunity to create an independent framework for policy towards the East 185 
came back onto the agenda in 2007. At this time another, albeit brief, Polish non-
paper was circulated. Unlike previous Polish initiatives, this document avoided direct 
reference to the Eastern Dimension. Rather, it emphasized the development of 
‘regional cooperation’ in the context of the new independent eastern framework as 
something complementary to the existing policies, such as the ENP, the Northern 190 
Dimension and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EURO-MED). The six countries 
to which the framework would apply included Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and potentially also Belarus, all of which were later included in 
the EaP. The Polish suggestion was followed by a similar document from the Czech 
Republic. The ideas were also discussed by the four Visegrád states (Cianciara 2008). 195 
However, as reported by one of the interviewees,7 discord between the partners 
prevented the initiative being ‘branded’ as a Visegrád proposal. Whether Poland 
would have benefited from presenting the EaP as a joint Visegrád initiative is 
doubtful. Certainly a proposal from a larger group of newer Member States may well 
have initially gained a more favourable reception from within the Commission.8  200 
However, as stated, the political discord at the working level within the Visegrád 
group at this time prevented the Visegrád partners adopting Poland’s proposals as 
shared policy and there was no real incentive for Poland to push the policy within the 
Visegrád group because the V4 partners would be likely to support any policy move 
to improve relations with the eastern neighbours wherever it came from. Poland 205 
therefore appeared to have the opportunity to advance its position as an independent 
actor within the EU outside the confines of the Visegrád sub-regional partnership.   
The next Polish move was at the high political level. The Polish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Radek Sikorski, managed to convince his Swedish counterpart to 
support the idea of an Eastern Partnership as a distinct dimension of the wider ENP. 210 
Considering that Sweden was about to take over the rotating presidency of the EU, the 
choice of partner was an astute move on the part of Poland.  It essentially allowed the 
idea to be marketed as a joint initiative between a respected incumbent Member State 
and a new member. The Polish–Swedish non-paper on Eastern Partnership was 
presented on the 26 May 2008 to the Council of the European Union’s General Affairs 215 
and External Relations Council (GAERC) meeting in Brussels. The paper had been 
prepared by the Polish MFA, in consultation with the Polish Permanent 
Representation to the EU in Brussels.9 Think-tanks in Warsaw were also engaged in 
the conceptual phase, especially the Institute for Eastern Studies (Ośrodek Studiów 
Wschodnich, or OSW). The draft proposal built on previously presented documents 220 
and introduced the new idea of multi-lateral co-operation in the region and 
differentiation between the partners.  
The ‘Conclusions of the European Council’ in June 2008 welcomed the Polish–
Swedish proposals on the establishment of the EaP and asked the Commission to 
work on a more detailed programme (Council of the EU 2008, p. 19). Despite this 225 
positive development, these conclusions were much more modest than Poland initially 
wished for and proved to be more general when compared to the detailed text on the 
Union for the Mediterranean (UMed) which was also to be found in the Council’s 
official conclusions. While some (Commission) officials saw this as the result of a 
                                                        
7 Interview 54, European Commission DG External Relations, Brussels, 23 November 2009. 
8 Interview 41, European Commission DG External Relations, Brussels, 11 December 2009. 
9 ‘Polish-Swedish Proposal: Eastern Partnership’, June 2008, available at: 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/Polish-Swedish,Proposal,19911.html. The draft version of the proposal 
presented to the European Council was dated 23 May 2008. 
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lack of ambition on the part of Poland, compared with that presented and argued for 230 
by France on the UMed, other officials from the Council’s Secretariat General 
claimed it was a sign that Poland had learned to compromise and to better co-ordinate 
its policy goals with those of other Member States.10 These two opposing views show 
that the exact influence of Poland in the creation of the EaP and its content was 
unclear to some officials at this early stage. There appeared to be a degree of 235 
ambiguity on the part of officials about Poland’s role in the making of the EaP, raising 
questions about the real degree of influence over the development of the EaP Poland 
had at this time. It is this ambiguity that this article seeks to address through a detailed 
analysis of a set of elite interviews on the matter. Before turning to this, however, it is 
essential to describe and analyse what the Eastern Partnership was deemed to be and 240 
what it added to the EU’s policy toolkit in the eastern neighbourhood. 
 
 
Origins of the Eastern Partnership 
The importance of the EU’s policy towards its neighbours was acknowledged in the 245 
2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), which included references to security in the 
‘EU neighbourhood’ within three of the Union’s strategic objectives. It stated that 
‘neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states … organized crime … 
dysfunctional societies … [and] exploding population growth on its borders all pose 
problems for Europe’ (Council of the EU 2003). Regarding the East, it was asserted 250 
that it was not in the EU’s interest to create new dividing lines as a result of 
enlargement to central and eastern Europe (CEE) and, therefore, the EU should seek 
to extend ‘the benefits of economic and political cooperation […] while tackling 
political problems [in the eastern neighbourhood]’ (Council of the EU 2003). Thus the 
origins of the EaP can be traced back to the years immediately prior to the fifth 255 
enlargement of the Union to CEE in 2004/2007 (European Commission 2003, p. 3) 
which saw the EU recognise the need to take account of its new borders which 
brought it closer to the relatively more politically unstable and economically less 
developed former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Prior to this, the 
EU’s policy in the region was mainly concerned with its relations with its CEE 260 
candidate Member States on the one hand, and Russia on the other, with little 
consideration for other former Soviet republics. 
The first move by the EU to respond to the geopolitical and security realities of 
CEE enlargement came in the form of a proposal made by the UK in 2002, which 
became known as the New Neighbours’ Initiative (NNI) and was initially aimed only 265 
at three countries: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. A year later, as a consequence of 
lobbying by the Southern EU states, the programme was extended to include a 
number of the EU’s Southern partners located around the Mediterranean fringe and 
was renamed as ‘Wider Europe’. The concept was further developed by the 
Commission in a Strategy Paper published in May 2004 (European Commission 270 
2004). This subsequently led to yet another change in the name of the initiative, which 
from then on became known as the European Neighbourhood Policy. As argued by a 
senior official of the Commission, the novelty of the ENP was based on its new 
strategic framework, which was ‘an example of our foreign policy being more than 
traditional diplomacy’ (Landaburu 2006, p. 3), in the sense that it combined policies 275 
                                                        
10 Interview 38, European Council, Brussels, 9 December 2009. 
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from all traditional ‘pillars’ of the EU. Such an approach was arguably more 
comprehensive than conventional foreign policy. 
From the outset the ENP was widely perceived as an inadequate mechanism for 
(1) stabilizing all the EU’s neighbours and (2) setting them on a path towards much 
closer economic and political integration with the European Union, not least because 280 
the policy’s scope was so broad: covering an arc of states from Morocco in the south-
west, through north Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus to Moldova, Ukraine 
and Belarus in the north. Moreover, although the ENP did envisage, at least in the 
very long term, a European Economic Area-style relationship for the ENP countries, 
at the behest of less enlargement-friendly Member States, such as France and the 285 
‘Club Med’ countries, the policy deliberately made no mention of the possibility of 
the eventual accession of any of the ENP partners to the European Union. This lack of 
a powerful incentive for the ENP states to undertake difficult and expensive economic 
and political reforms, curtailed the policy’s development from the outset (see e.g. 
Sasse 2010, pp. 181–2). Moreover, the very notion of such a geographically wide-290 
ranging ENP managed simultaneously to offend the target countries in both North 
Africa (who were vexed at being grouped with former Soviet republics) and in 
Eastern Europe (who were angered by being placed on an equal footing with ‘non-
European’ countries that according to Article 49 TEU lacked even the possibility of 
eventual EU accession).  295 
The question of accession has proven to be particularly important in the debate 
about the future of the ENP for the eastern European states targeted by the policy. 
This has challenged official EU rhetoric on the issue and even though the discourse 
was somewhat softened and no longer referred to partnership as a ‘substitute for 
enlargement’, the Commission clearly stated that the EU ‘emphasized that it offers 300 
[the ENP as] a means to reinforce relations between the EU and partner countries, 
which is distinct from the possibilities available to European countries under Article 
49 of the Treaty on European Union’ (European Commission 2004, p. 3). On this vital 
point the EU’s Member States were strongly divided, with many of the newer, 
northern and eastern Member States more strongly in favour, and the older, 305 
particularly southern, Member States far less enthusiastic, and indeed categorically 
opposed, to any talk of membership for ENP states. Whilst the argument could be 
made under Article 49 of the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU) that the 
‘European’ ENP states of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus certainly have the theoretical 
right to apply for EU membership, it is very doubtful that they would come close to 310 
qualifying for membership for a considerable period of time. As such, it has been 
argued that the ENP neither sufficiently confronts ‘the ghost of enlargement’, nor 
seriously addresses problems affecting neighbouring states or achieves coherence 
with relations to them (Smith 2005, p. 767; Emerson, Noutcheva & Popescu 2007; 
Whitman & Wolff 2010b, pp. 12-13).  315 
Nonetheless, it was precisely this difference between the potential future status of 
the ENP countries in the east from those in the south that encouraged those EU 
Member States friendly towards eastern Europe (led by Poland) to push for a change 
in the nature of the relationship between the EU and the eastern ENP countries. 
Following the 2008 joint proposal by Poland and Sweden to the European Council for 320 
the creation of the so-called Eastern Partnership, the European Council finally 
requested a detailed proposal from the Commission, which was originally scheduled 
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to be unveiled during the Czech Presidency of the European Union during the first 
half of 2009.11 
This small, but important step for the development of the EaP was, however, soon 325 
to take on a more hurried pace with the EaP dramatically rising in importance on the 
European foreign policy agenda following Russia’s intervention in the conflict 
between Georgia and its breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 
2008. This was the first time that Russian forces had intervened militarily outside of 
the Russian Federation in the ex-Soviet space since 1991. The rapid disintegration of 330 
the Georgian army and the speed of the Russian advance beyond the territories of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia towards Tbilisi prompted an emergency meeting of the 
European Council to discuss the situation. The feeling that the Union urgently needed 
to act decisively and demonstrate a plausible commitment to stabilizing what, in 
August 2008, appeared to be a highly volatile region, led to the decision to bring 335 
forward the launch of the Eastern Partnership to 3 December 2008 (European 
Commission 2008, 823 final). The resultant Commission document was endorsed by 
the 27 Foreign Ministers of the EU and 5 Eastern Partnership (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova) states in a Joint Declaration following the Prague 
Eastern Partnership Summit on 7 May 2009 (European Council 2009). 340 
 
 
Content of the Eastern Partnership 
The EU’s external relations with its near neighbours is a policy area that was already 
well furnished with initiatives, but the addition of the EaP certainly strengthened the 345 
EU’s toolkit with regard to Eastern Europe. The EaP’s rhetoric was based on what the 
Commission called ‘a lasting message of EU solidarity’ (European Commission 2008) 
between the EU and the ‘European’ ENP states; but, far more importantly, it also 
sought to provide new tools to assist with the pre-existing and longer-standing ENP 
objectives of nurturing democracy, the rule of law and the development of free market 350 
economies through an open-ended European integration process, albeit one that would 
not necessarily lead to full accession. Its second area of novelty lay in encouraging the 
EaP countries to cooperate multi-laterally between themselves, under the watchful eye 
of the European Union; this would provide the motor for the regional cooperation 
deemed so important for their future security. In addition to the established ENP goal 355 
of a European Economic Area (EEA)-style integration between the EU and the ENP 
countries, the EaP foresaw the creation of a regional ‘Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area’ between the EaP countries as a precursor to deeper economic integration 
with the EU – performing a similar function to that of the Central European Free 
Trade Association (CEFTA) for the central European states in the 1990s. However, in 360 
common with the CEFTA countries in the 1990s, enthusiasm for the idea was 
somewhat muted – after all what mattered to the EaP countries was access to the 
wealthy single market. For the EU, however, encouraging the EaP countries to work 
together was of paramount importance.  
The EaP retained the pre-existing bi-lateral elements of cooperation between the 365 
European Union and eastern Europe, including the upgrading of relations with the 
EaP countries, which is envisaged to take place through the signing of a series of 
Association Agreements.12 Considerable mention was also made of the eventual visa 
                                                        
11 Interview 41, European Commission DG External Relations, Brussels, 11 December 2009.  
12 The use of the term Association Agreements was at first contested, with some Member States calling 
for the name ‘Enhanced Agreement’ to be employed, implicitly avoiding making a link between the 
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liberalization necessary to improve the mobility of citizens between the EU and ENP 
states – but this was expressed more as a longer-term aspiration than as something to 370 
be offered immediately.  Enhanced cooperation between the EaP countries and the EU 
was also proposed in a range of policy areas that envisaged eventual convergence in 
areas ranging from Justice and Home Affairs to education policy. The Association 
Agreements which were to be negotiated, agreed and ratified on a bilateral basis have 
proven slow to materialise, with none of the EaP states having as of June 2013 signed 375 
an agreement.  The agreements are to be governed by Association Councils with the 
power to make decisions that are legally binding on both parties (the EU and the EaP 
states), which would, in a small way, redress the vast imbalance in the power 
relationship between the EU and its eastern neighbours. Separate from the Association 
Agreements, it was also confirmed that the EaP would include, from the beginning, 380 
high-level regular meetings between the two sides. These twice-yearly summits of 
Heads of State and Government from the EU and the EaP would continue to provide 
momentum for the integration process and encourage EaP states to keep moving 
towards the Association Agreements. These meetings would be supplemented by an 
annual meeting of foreign ministers and a twice-yearly meetings of senior officials. 385 
These meetings are considered very useful for the smaller EaP countries which 
otherwise would struggle to arrange high-level meetings with EU leaders. 
Although the bi-lateral agenda of the Eastern Partnership was theoretically 
attractive to the EaP states (barring the low levels of funding available for the policy 
where around €785 million was earmarked for all the EaP countries between 2009 and 390 
2013, compared with the €67 billion received by Poland alone in structural and 
regional funds between 2007 and 201313), it did not really represent much in the way 
of new goals and objectives. The true policy innovation lay in the development of 
multi-lateral cooperation, lying on top of the bi-lateral context of the ENP (for more 
on this last aspect, see Boonstra & Shapovalova 2010). 395 
 
 
Added-Value of the Eastern Partnership 
The launch of the EaP aimed to send a clear message of solidarity to the eastern 
neighbourhood countries and offered the genuine possibility of much stronger links 400 
between them and the European Union through a ‘deep and comprehensive free trade 
area’ (DCFTA) and eventual visa liberalization – both of which are highly attractive 
to the EaP countries.  However, these positive elements should be tempered by the 
fact that the DCFTAs proved difficult to negotiate and there remained a need for these 
states to prove that they have overcome certain domestic political challenges. For the 405 
rest of the EaP states, other than Ukraine, finalisation is likely to take longer, while 
for Ukraine, its DCFTA agreement was initialled in June 2012, but the subsequent 
signature and ratification was delayed by the EU following concerns about the rule of 
law in Ukraine.  Visa liberalization also remains an ‘aspiration’, but with the EU 
imposing a very strict set of benchmarks and conditionality criteria it is likely that it 410 
                                                                                                                                                              
signing of an Association Agreement and a commitment to eventual accession in the way that followed 
the signing of the 1994/1995 Association Agreements (also commonly called Europe Agreements) with 
the central European countries that joined in the Fifth Enlargement in 2004/2007. 
13 ‘Cohesion policy 2007–13: Poland, the biggest beneficiary, has plan and priorities agreed with the 
Commission’. Commission Press Release, Reference: IP/07/633, Date: 8 May 2007, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/633&format=HTML&aged=0&langua
ge=EN&guiLanguage=en, last accessed 5 July 2013. 
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will be sometime before visa-free travel between the EU and EaP states is achieved.  
Another criticism is that the EaP has never guaranteed eventual accession to the 
Union, nor has it categorically ruled it out, thus allowing the issue to become 
something of ‘an the elephant in the room’, although to be fair to the EU, there was no 
point discussing membership if the definitive answer was to be ‘no’ for the 415 
foreseeable future.  This raises very specific questions about the added value of the 
EaP and whether it has truly moved the issue of EU-Eastern European relations 
forwards.   
In response to this concern, and looking beyond the high politics aspirations of EU 
membership, it is possible to observe that the added-value of the EaP may lie 420 
primarily in the fact that the policy set in motion the development of the 
Comprehensive Institution Building (CIB) programme.  This was designed to help the 
EaP countries prepare for European integration by strengthening their administrative 
capacity. The CIB sets modest, achievable targets that should, in theory, lead to 
progress in meeting the policy’s stated highline aims and objectives, such as 425 
approximating and successfully implementing key elements of the acquis 
communautaire. This process is monitored annually by the Commission – as was the 
case with CEE enlargement during the 1990s and early 2000s. This depoliticization of 
the approach towards the eastern neighbours may prove exceptionally valuable in the 
future. This is relevant because the ENP was criticized because of its failure to 430 
adequately separate ‘high’ from ‘low’ politics or technical issues from politicized 
aspects; for example, the prospective of membership. This is reminiscent of similar 
arguments made in the case of CEE relations with the EU in the early 1990s following 
the development of early Association Agreements (Dangerfield 2000).   
Importantly for the EaP states and the pro-enlargement Member States, the EaP 435 
allows potential Member States in the east to be separated from the ‘neighbours of 
Europe’ in the south (Lobjakas 2008). It also represents a modest amount of progress 
in the potential depth and quality of relationship with the Union that the EaP countries 
can aspire to. Moreover, once they have met particular objectives, a fresh set of short-
term goals can be set – and thus, little by little, the quality of relations with the EU 440 
should improve. Ultimately, in the view of many interviewees, the EaP’s ‘offer’ to the 
eastern ENP states was the best that could have been agreed at that particular point in 
time, in 2008 and 2009, given the divisions between the EU’s Member States on any 
future enlargement beyond that to the Western Balkans (but not Turkey, which 
remains controversial despite its candidate status). Indeed without the Russian 445 
intervention in Georgia in 2008, in the opinion of one Commission official, the 
Eastern Partnership might have amounted to rather less in the way of substance.14  
 
 
Poland’s Influence on the Eastern Partnership 450 
Building on the previous two sections this third section examines how successful 
Poland has been in ‘uploading’ its long-held national policy preferences for relations 
with eastern Europe onto the common EU agenda, and in doing so it attempts an 
assessment of Poland’s influence on the policy area during the first phase of the EaP’s 
development. The authors have chosen to investigate Poland’s attempts to influence 455 
this particular policy area since the Polish government made it explicitly clear both 
before and after EU accession in 2004 that it aimed to make its mark in the EU in this 
                                                        
14 Interview 41, European Commission DG External Relations, Brussels, 11 December 2009. 
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domain. Thus, the intensity with which its policy preference in this area is held, is 
very high – a necessary although not sufficient condition for influence. Of course, 
Poland has other policy priorities in the EU, such as the budget or the Common 460 
Agricultural Policy, but it has never claimed that it wished to reshape either of these 
radically. Thus the choice of relations with the eastern neighbours is highly 
appropriate for this study.   
Proceeding with our analysis, we return to the factors which can be used to assess 
the capacity of a Member State on a given policy area that were proposed by the 465 
authors in 2010 (Copsey & Pomorska 2010). Table 1 (below) gives a summary 
qualitative indication in the right hand column of whether Polish performance 
improved for a given variable after the election of the Civic Platform-led coalition 
government in October 2007. 
 470 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE  
(see end of article for table) 
 
The six factors set out in Table 1 should be taken into consideration in addition to 
the two fixed variables that determine the potential influence of a given Member 475 
State: population and total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Copsey & Pomorska 
2010). Even these fixed variables are not completely set in stone, after all the 
population of the Member States relative to one another does shift over time: 
Germany became about a third larger than France, the UK and Italy after the 
extraordinary one-off event of reunification in 1990 and the higher birth rate in the 480 
UK and France relative to Germany and Italy may again slightly tilt the balance over 
the next quarter century – or not. The relative GDP of Member States also varies a 
little over time too. This may occur very gradually as a result of structural 
improvements in economic performance, and much more rapidly as a result of 
exchange rate fluctuations – though this is no longer the case, of course, between euro 485 
area Member States. Historically, the UK improved its performance significantly from 
the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s vis-à-vis the other large European economies and 
moved from being the poorest large Member State to more or less parity with the 
others. Albeit with some interruption as a result of the economic crisis of 2007–09, 
the newer Member States have increased their GDP relative to the other EU countries 490 
sharply since 2004 through higher growth and appreciating currencies. Nonetheless, 
the key point for these variables that could be said to determine potential influence in 
the EU is that they shift far too slowly for any particular government to be able to 
affect a radical change during its term of office. Thus, for the purposes of this study, 
we concentrate solely on Polish performance for each of the explanatory factors set 495 
out in Table 1. 
We begin with the variables where we judge Polish performance to be most 




Skill at Alliance Building 
It is the field of alliance building in the European Union where Polish performance 
could be said to have improved most strongly between 2007 and 2009. The election of 
the Donald Tusk’s administration in 2007 was welcomed in Brussels with relief and 505 
to paraphrase one cabinet official in the European Commission, the Brussels 
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community was anxious to welcome the new government.15 Tusk and his foreign 
minister Radek Sikorski were viewed so positively because their predecessors, Prime 
Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and foreign minister Anna Fotyga had been unpopular, 
which was reflected well in the European media. Parallels were drawn by the official 510 
with the election of Sarkozy after Chirac, who became increasingly undiplomatic in 
his second term of office (2002–2007), particularly at the time of the Iraq war, when 
he remarked that the then pre-accession central European states had missed ‘a good 
opportunity to keep quiet’ and were ‘not well brought up’.16  
The evaluation of officials both from the Commission and the Council Secretariat 515 
was that from 2007 the Poles learnt to compromise and be more modest in their 
proposals.17 The clearest example of this was in deciding to launch the EaP jointly 
with another Member State, rather than presenting the plan as a purely Polish 
initiative. On the other hand, as one official pointed out, it meant also sharing this 
success and losing to certain extent the ‘ownership’ of the proposal. Still, it could be 520 
argued that one of the lessons learnt by Polish diplomats in Brussels was to accept this 
trade-off. 
The choice of Sweden was not immediate – other Member States were solicited as 
potential partners for Poland, as one anonymous Lithuanian official recalled: 
 525 
We were approached quite early on, Poland addressed Lithuania at the very beginning and then 
things cooled off … Poland realized that Sweden was a better partner to work with because it was 
headed for the Presidency … we did feel left out. 
 
A similar account came from the Czech Republic, who raised the initiative within 530 
the Visegrád Group and presented its non-paper there for discussion. 
Another official noted that the Polish MFA has a tactic of adopting a policy of 
complete silence when unsure of how to respond to a tricky matter in the hope that the 
problem will just go away18 – and expressed mild diplomatic frustration with this sort 
of behaviour, which shows that perhaps the Polish administration still had some 535 
creases to iron out in its alliance-building strategy. Nonetheless, the choice of Sweden 
was excellent – a Member State with the reputation of being a reliable, honest broker, 
a solid advocate of deeper integration with the European Union for the EaP countries 
and of eventual Ukrainian accession to the European Union, as well as an altruist in 
foreign affairs. Generally, involving Swedish partners was considered as a smart 540 
move on the part of Polish diplomats and, in particular, of Polish Foreign Minister 
Radek Sikorski. Swedes had a particular impact on the later, more practical shaping of 
the Eastern Partnership work programmes, and also discouraged the Poles from 
attempting a more ambitious project. The presentation of the initiative also improved 
after the Swedes joined, with one Commission official claiming that Sweden 545 
‘translated the EaP into the language of the EU’. In the words of one Swedish official,  
 
In the very beginning, Poland suggested an initiative that was very far from what we have now. 
Initially, they wanted to organize an initiative that would be parallel to and separate from the ENP. 
                                                        
15 Interview 31, European Commission, Brussels, 20 February 2009. 
16 See CNN, 13 February 2003, ‘Chirac Lashes Out at New Europe’, available at: 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/18/sprj.irq.chirac/, last accessed 8 July 2013. 
17 Interview 38, European Council, Brussels,  9 December 2009 & Interview 40, European Commission 
DG External Relations, 10 December 2009. 
18 Other officials have noted that the Polish Foreign Ministry has a tendency to ignore letters that it 
does not know how to respond to. Interview 23, UK Embassy, 16 May 2008. 
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The Polish government wanted to create something else, something new. At that time, Sweden did 550 
not support the idea very much because we are committed to ENP in its current form.19 
 
The Swedish official thus indicated that the Polish idea for a new initiative 
towards the East evolved over time and shifted from a highly ambitious project, the 
details of which were never fleshed out because it never left the drawing board, to 555 
being a more pragmatic proposal that could be launched together with the Swedes. In 
addition to this ‘critical friend’ feedback offered in the early stages of the EaP, the 
Swedes crucially provided extensive support at a much later stage in the evolution of 
the EaP, this time for the Czech Presidency in steering the EaP through the Council 
working groups. In the words of one anonymous official from the Commission, the 560 
Czechs were ‘incapable of bringing the ship safely to port without the Swedes’.20 For 
the Poles too, being able to draw upon the Swedish reputation, their longer experience 
as a Member State and all the intricate detail about how to manage a project through 
the structures of the European institutions was invaluable. Of course, this suited the 
Swedes too, because by partnering with a new Member State, like Poland or 565 
Lithuania, with a reputation for being ‘vociferous, more active and even provocative’, 
helped Sweden to be ‘perceived as a more moderate partner’ since ‘with other 
countries more extreme than ourselves we gain a good bargaining position’.21 
Another factor that signals Poland’s closer attention to alliance building was the 
greatly improved relationship with Germany following the Parliamentary election of 570 
2007. The efforts of both Donald Tusk and Radek Sikorski to take a softer line on the 
‘politics of the past’, for example, on the Centre Against Expulsions under the 
auspices of a planned German Historical Museum Institute, no doubt contributed to 
this. The previous Polish Law and Justice-led coalition government as well as Polish 
President Lech Kaczyński had often been undiplomatic about Germany, as has been 575 
documented elsewhere (Copsey & Pomorska 2010). The importance of the alliance 
with Germany is best summarized in the words of an anonymous Commission 
official: ‘It is important to recognize that Poland’s role in the EU is highly 
conditioned by its relationship with Germany which in turn is conditioned by 
Germany’s relationship with Russia’.22  580 
Relations with France and the UK were ‘surprisingly good’, in the opinion of one 
experienced official.23 Nonetheless, the relations with the southern Member States, 
especially with Spain, remained slightly strained (for example, regarding the re-
admission procedure with Georgia). Poland also did not introduce the initiative as a 
Visegrád idea and for some time had a difficult relationship with the Czechs, who felt 585 
excluded (in spite of the fact that they also presented a non-paper which was 
discussed between the Visegrád partners).24  
Finally, effective coalition building in the EU requires excellent coordination 
between different issues and, therefore, also between different institutional bodies, 
such as the Council Working Groups. In the complex Brussels game, where 590 
negotiations are based on package deals, having an overview of the whole agenda is 
essential. It was claimed by a Commission official that Poland still needed to master 
the skill of ‘playing on a few pianos at the same time’.25 Poland’s weakness in this 
                                                        
19 Interview 33, Swedish COEST, Brussels, 10 November 2009. 
20 Interview 40, European Commission DG External Relations, Brussels, 10 December 2009. 
21 Interview 33, Swedish COEST, Brussels, 10 November 2009. 
22 Interview 41, European Commission DG External Relations, Brussels, 11 December 2009. 
23 Interview 54, European Commission DG External Relations, Brussels, 23 November 2009. 
24 Interview 32, Czech COEST, Brussels, 26 October 2009. 
25 Interview 40, European Commission DG External Relations, Brussels, 10 December 2009. 
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area is linked to another assessment criteria in our analysis – administrative capacity 




During the course of 2007 and 2008, Poland’s arguments for an upgrading of the 
institutional framework for relations with the Union’s eastern neighbours certainly 600 
became more persuasive. Three reasons can be identified to explain this improvement 
to Poland’s skills-set as an advocate in foreign affairs. 
First, the Polish government and administration’s image in Brussels, as well as its 
reputation as a credible and reliable partner was boosted over time by a change of 
government following the elections of 2007. The new Civic Platform-led coalition 605 
abandoned the rhetoric of euroscepticism (Cianciara 2008) and, following an 
embarrassing tug-of-war between President Kaczyński and Prime Minister Tusk over 
who represented Poland at summits, which culminated in two separate delegations 
arriving at the Council in Brussels on 15 October 2008 necessitating a game of 
musical chairs in the Council chamber to allow the President to take a seat next to the 610 
Prime Minister26, the primary responsibility for foreign affairs was assumed by the 
Government and foreign minister. In May 2009, the Polish Constitutional Court ruled 
that the President may himself decide whether to participate in the European Council, 
but it is the Government who decides what the Polish position will be (Gazeta Prawna 
2009).  The Court also ruled that the President did not have the prerogative to conduct 615 
an independent foreign policy or to direct relations with international organisations.  
Second, the Polish government became a little more measured in its advocacy of 
Ukraine and the eastern neighbours’ integration potential. Calls for a membership 
perspective to be extended to the eastern partnership countries were dropped, as one 
Commission official noted, ‘both Poland and Sweden were circumspect at COEST’27 620 
not pushing too far or too fast. It seemed that the Poles had learnt an important lesson 
concerning the value of ‘constructive ambiguity’ for a policy area where there are 
considerable differences of opinion between the Member States. This strategic 
behaviour does not imply any change in the crucial interest of bringing Ukraine into 
the EU, but rather the adoption of different tactics. However, there remained some 625 
work for Polish officials to undertake in finessing their skills at playing the Brussels 
game, and they remained, in the words of the same official, ‘rather rough around the 
edges … too vocal in pushing the national interest’.28   
A similar, moderate strategy was used when the Poles approached the 
Commission. There were consultations between Polish officials from the MFA in 630 
Warsaw and the Commission in March and April 2008. As reported in the interviews, 
what surprised some officials in Brussels was that the Poles repeated persistently that 
the initiative was not anti-Russian and that it had nothing to do with the membership 
perspective for the countries involved. However, some of Poland’s partners in the 
Union thought that the Polish government was protesting too much – after years of 635 
presenting itself as a steely, sceptical cold warrior vis-à-vis Russia and emphasizing 
the geopolitical imperative of preventing Russian expansion, the Polish government 
                                                        
26 See, ‘Polish President Wins EU Summit Bunfight’, available at: http://euobserver.com/9/26948, last 
accessed 5 July 2013. 
27 COEST is a geographical Council Working Group dealing with Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
28 Interview 40, European Commission DG External Relations, Brussels, 10 December 2009.  
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lacked credibility in arguing that there was nothing anti-Russian in the EaP (whether 
the statement was objectively accurate or otherwise).  
Third, the credibility of the Polish sceptical position on the role played by Russia 640 
within the political sphere occupied by EaP states was much enhanced by the Russian 
intervention in Georgia in 2008. Russia’s actions did not bring about a great shift in 
the attitude of the Russia-friendly Member States, such as Germany, France and Italy. 
After all, the Georgian government was not judged to have acted entirely innocently 
in the run-up to the conflict either. However, the war in Georgia cast a very 645 
favourable light on a case that had been advocated by Poland for a number of years: 
that the countries between Russia and the European Union needed an improved 
relationship with the EU, partly for their own security and partly for the security of 
the EU.  
Thus, it was not so much that Poland’s underlying arguments in favour of an 650 
improved institutional framework for relations with the Eastern neighbours had 
shifted radically, beyond abandoning advocacy of a membership perspective in the 
near future, rather an exogenous event provided a much-needed boost to the 
credibility of a long-held Polish position, which also raised relations with the Eastern 
neighbours up the Commission’s agenda. 655 
 
 
Receptiveness of Other Member States 
The third area in which there had been improvement in the capacity of Poland to 
exercise influence on the area of relations with the eastern neighbours concerns the 660 
receptiveness of other Member States to Polish ideas about improving the relationship 
between the EU and its eastern neighbours. Three factors were of crucial importance 
here: (1) the war in Georgia in 2008, which came only a few weeks after the original 
proposal for an Eastern Partnership; (2) the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean 
during the French Presidency of 2008; and (3) the election of Nicholas Sarkozy as 665 
President of France in 2007.  
Before turning to these key points, it is worth re-iterating that in headline terms, 
the positions of the Member States on the finalité politique of Ukraine’s European 
integration remained much the same in 2010 as previously, with the usual splits 
between the central European 2004 accession Member States (plus the UK and 670 
Sweden) which are in favour of accession (particularly for Ukraine) and the Club Med 
countries (Spain, Italy, France, Portugal and Greece) plus Austria and Belgium which 
are firmly against. The other Member States tend to fall somewhere in the middle of 
these two positions, erring more on the side of strong scepticism about accession, 
however distant. For this reason, the membership question is never discussed in 675 
Brussels – to the frustration of the Ukrainians especially. 
Nonetheless, the positions of some Member States shifted in 2008 towards being a 
little more accommodating towards the Eastern neighbours’ desire to integrate with 
the EU. At the very least, the Member States recognize that the EU needs to have a 
stronger presence in the region as an initiator of multi-lateral co-operation between 680 
the six former Soviet Republics that make up the region (excluding Russia) – which 
is, of course, what the Eastern Partnership seeks to do. This was certainly the result of 
the war in Georgia in August 2008 (as confirmed by a number of interviewed 
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officials29; see also Ochman 2010, pp. 4-5 for a German position), which underlined 
the costs of non-engagement or limited engagement in the region. While the 685 
interviewee at the Secretariat General of the Council claimed that the EaP initiative 
was warmly welcomed from the very beginning, one anonymous senior official 
described the progress of the EaP idea through the Commission from the initial 
Polish–Swedish proposal as something more complex: 
 690 
Well, because it came from the NMS [new member state] there was automatic sympathy, but the 
general attitude to the proposal was rather negative. Having yet more initiatives did not seem 
credible to the Commission. We had a lot already. So we were sceptical about the added-value and 
the multi-lateral dimension. We saw no need for a new initiative […] What changed all this was 
the war in Georgia. The Emergency European Council sent a request to the Commission to speed 695 
up and bring forward proposals from spring 2009 to autumn/winter 2008. Some member states felt 
that we couldn’t stand up to Russia directly but we could foster cooperation in the region […] we 
needed a positive signal to the Georgians […] At that point in the Commission we knew that a 
more ambitious proposal would fly.  So it was a success for Polish diplomacy – but they were 
pushing at an open door. Support came from the very top of the Commission. From Barroso and 700 
Catherine Day, who convened a meeting of the Director-Generals and told them to fast-track the 
proposal.30 
 
This account of events was confirmed by other interviewees from the 
Commission. Other officials stressed that without the crisis in Georgia the Polish 705 
proposal would either have been ‘left on the shelf’ or have moved very slowly, due to 
its lukewarm reception from senior officials at the Commission’s Directorate General 
for External Relations (DG Relex).  
It was not only the war in Georgia that prompted a shift on the part of those 
Member States traditionally hostile towards upgrading the EU’s relations with its 710 
eastern neighbours, it also helped that the Union for the Mediterranean for relations 
with the EU’s southern neighbours had already been agreed – acting as a quid pro quo 
for the Eastern Partnership. As one Spanish official noted, the ‘Eastern Partnership 
does not fall in the sphere of our natural interests’31 (which are the Mediterranean and 
Latin America), but the Spanish were not actively opposed to the policy set out in the 715 
Eastern Partnership since it has been agreed by all the Member States. In other words, 
once a policy idea has been adopted by consensus, everyone has to back it, or at least 
not actively oppose its continuation. Moving relations with the eastern neighbours 
away from the political towards the technical was an important part of the Polish 
strategy; as an anonymous official underlined, the Poles aimed to ‘discourage our 720 
partners from imposing a political perspective on everything’.32 As a Polish official 
admitted, the aim was ‘not to make a revolution’ but rather deepen existing relations. 
A final illustration of how the receptiveness of the other Member States towards 
Poland’s ideas for relations with the eastern neighbours altered to the advantage of the 
Poles, can be found in the case of France. France is not only a large, rich and founding 725 
Member State of the Union but it can also perhaps be described as a ‘veto player’ on 
EU external policy and, certainly, on enlargement issues. The French position has 
undergone a considerable evolution since the election of President Nicholas Sarkozy 
in 2007 and France could now be cautiously described as being in favour of some 
                                                        
29 Interview 40, European Commission DG External Relations, Brussels, 10 December 2009; Interview 
41, European Commission DG External Relations, Brussels, 11 December 2009; Interview 38, 
European Council, Brussels, 9 December 2009. 
30 Interview 41, European Commission DG External Relations, Brussels, 11 December 2009. 
31 Interview 45, Spanish COEST, Brussels, 27 November 2009. 
32 Interview 34, Polish COEST, Brussels, 27 October 2009. 
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European integration for the countries of the East, in contrast to the Chirac Presidency 730 
(1995–2007) when France had in the words of one French diplomat ‘an extremely 
restrictive approach to Ukraine’,33 a position which hardened following the defeat of 
the European Constitutional Treaty in a French referendum in 2006.  
France is now a supporter of the Eastern Partnership and recognizes that relations 
with the eastern neighbours need to be put on a firmer footing through the negotiation 735 
of Association Agreements. However, there remain in the words of a French diplomat 
two ‘red lines’34 for France’s attitude towards Ukraine’s European integration. First, 
‘all debate on enlargement must be excluded from discussions with Ukraine’.35 
Second, the balance must be maintained between per capita spending in the Eastern 
neighbourhood and spending in the Southern neighbourhood – that is the South will 740 
receive rather more than the East by virtue of its higher population. An anonymous 
Commission official also reported that France has argued that for every extra cent 




Our assessment of administrative capacity of Poland remains more critical. The 
evidence points at remaining weaknesses with regard to initiating, co-ordinating and 
following-up the policies in Brussels. One anonymous official, while admitting there 
was a lot of improvement in this area, for example in the quality of response to the 750 
Commission’s proposals from the Polish side, said there remained ‘room for 
improvement’. The timing of Polish initiatives was not always appropriate – after all, 
it was sheer chance that the war in Georgia broke out not long after the Poles and 
Swedes had put forward their proposals. Internal tensions over external relations 
competences and the involvement of the Office of the Committee for European 755 
Integration (UKIE) were another issue that has yet to be resolved in order to achieve 
more effective policy co-ordination. A couple of other officials questioned the 
effectiveness of the new division of labour and co-operation between the old ‘core’ 
MFA and UKIE since the incorporation of the latter into the former. 
Some officials from the Commission thought Poland had ‘not existed in Brussels 760 
with regard to the Eastern Partnership’37’ after it had been ‘rubber-stamped’ by the 
European Council in June 2008. They had the impression that Warsaw was 
celebrating this success without actively engaging in shaping the future of the policy 
in detail – and thus were it not for the war in Georgia, the initiative would have trailed 
off into nothing, as is often the case with these kinds of new ideas for policies. More 765 
experienced Member States follow-up the shaping of their proposals, albeit discreetly. 
One official claimed that Warsaw did not have enough people who understood how 
the European Commission really worked and what instruments could be used now to 
‘push things forward’. Those who had previously worked in the Polish Permanent 
Representation either left to work in the institutions or, after returning to the MFA in 770 
Warsaw, were quickly rotated (for example, to Vienna, Washington or Madrid). It 
                                                        
33 Interview 37, ex French COEST, Brussels, 9 December 2009. 
34 Interview 37, ex French COEST, Brussels, 9 December 2009 
35 Interview 37, ex French COEST, Brussels, 9 December 2009 
36 Interview 40, European Commission DG External Relations, Brussels, 10 December 2009. 
37 Interview 55, European Commission DG External Relations, Brussels, 23 November 2009. 
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seemed to one official in the Commission that in Poland there is still the perception of 
‘us in Warsaw’ and ‘them in Brussels’.38  
In consequence, many proposals are prepared for internal political audiences, 
rather than to bring real change in the EU. As an example of such an initiative, which 775 
had many positive aspects, but was not properly introduced, was the Polish idea of 
making the choice of the EU High Representative for the CFSP more transparent. One 
anonymous Warsaw-based Polish official believed that had Poland consulted more 
closely with Brussels-based Polish officials, the idea could have been presented 
earlier, for example, through a think-tank or a foundation and not by the Polish MFA 780 
itself. 
The disconnect between Warsaw and Brussels was highlighted by one senior and 
very experienced Polish official, who argued that ‘Poland has trouble getting its 
people to cooperate’.39 In particular, there was a lack of cooperation between Poles 
working in the European institutions and for the Polish government, either in Brussels 785 
in the Permanent Representation or Warsaw. The official went on to state that 
‘cooperation between those who work on Europe both in Warsaw and Brussels is both 
crucial and lacking’.40 Successful Member States build networks of officials and 
‘there are not enough Poles in senior positions and not enough in the cabinets … 
Getting Poles into the right jobs is a problem for the Perm Rep and for Warsaw … the 790 
Perm Rep is just not a good intermediary for Poles seeking employment’’41 A final 
point strongly expressed was that Poles working for European institutions outside the 
office of the Polish Commissioner are seen as ‘not one of us’. The official also 
revealed that, following the best practice of older Member States, the Polish 
government had convened a meeting in Warsaw of senior Poles working for the 795 
European institutions in Brussels in an attempt to build a network and to discuss the 
Polish government’s European agenda for the coming year with them. However, 
when the officials working for European institutions attempted to comment on the 
Polish government proposals they were told to sit down and keep their opinions to 
themselves since they ‘had left the Polish service’ and were ‘working for 800 
foreigners’.42 This would appear to be clear evidence that it takes a very long time for 
new Member States to shift their mindset towards feeling that they are full members 
of the European Union – and to have the confidence to realise that Polish officials 
working at a senior level in the EU represents a success and are a valuable asset for 




The main argument in this article is that in the opinion of Poland’s partners in the 
Permanent Representations of the other Member States and officials in Brussels, the 810 
launch of the Eastern Partnership was to a considerable extent the fruit of persistent 
Polish efforts in this policy area. The article also demonstrates that the negotiations 
which led to the launch of the Eastern Partnership showed that by mid-2008 Poland 
had learnt important lessons about how to adapt, modify and adjust national policy 
preferences in such a way that they could be rebranded as ‘European’ preferences and 815 
                                                        
38 Interview 31, European Commission, Brussels, 20 February 2009. 
39 Interview 31, European Commission, Brussels, 20 February 2009. 
40 Interview 31, European Commission, Brussels, 20 February 2009. 
41 Interview 31, European Commission, Brussels, 20 February 2009. 
42 Interview 31, European Commission, Brussels, 20 February 2009. 
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not simply ‘Polish’ preferences. Nonetheless, Poland’s performance was not entirely 
flawless and there were still shortcomings on the Polish side, especially in 
coordination between Brussels and Warsaw as well as with the follow-up process.  
We argue that the Polish government elected in 2007 appeared to have learnt a 
number of key lessons for the conduct of negotiations with its partners in the EU, as 820 
follows. First, the Poles learned to tone down their rhetoric and to put forward modest 
proposals that are harder for the other Member States to oppose without seeming 
unreasonable. Secondly, the Poles had learned the value of what one official termed 
‘constructive ambiguity’. This consists of recognizing that the best means of 
advancing one’s goals in a policy domain where there is a lack of collective 825 
enthusiasm or agreement about what the eventual outcome should be is quite simply 
to be studiously vague about where the policy is heading. Given the clear lack of 
consensus between the Member States about what kind of relationship (for example, 
accession to the EU, an EEA or European Free Trade Association (EFTA) style 
partnership, a ‘privileged partnership’) they want with their eastern neighbours, such a 830 
policy of ‘constructive ambiguity’ is highly appropriate. Forging a consensus based 
on this guiding principle could in essence be said to consist of three elements, which 
are as follows. First, set concrete, minimalistic targets for the given policy domain 
that all the Member States can agree on. Second, depoliticize the overall policy issue 
by making the achievement of the modest goals set a purely bureaucratic issue that 835 
can be managed by the European Commission. Third, set a relatively short timeframe 
for the completion of the modest set of targets and once these objectives have been 
met, put in place another modest set of targets. This strategy represents a rediscovery 
with a recalibration of the tried-and-tested, incremental ‘Monnet method’ of European 
integration that focused on the logic of small steps that are at least moving towards 840 
the goal of integration, however slowly. 
Poland’s ability to exercise influence in the European Union during its first years 
of membership remained constrained by its weakness in administrative capacity, the 
primary factor highlighted in our earlier work (Copsey & Pomorska 2010). Only part 
of this can be still explained by a lack of experience, but it also seemed that the kind 845 
of structures that would oblige Polish officials to work constructively together were 
not yet fully in place. Major problems in this area were the lack of effective co-
ordination, and continued weaknesses in ‘lobbying’ the EU institutions, especially in 
the phase after the policy had been accepted by the Council. Re-rotating the officials 
returning to Warsaw from Brussels and weak systems of knowledge transfer (also of 850 
the lessons learned at the individual level) for those leaving to the EU institutions are 
one of the obstacles to improvement in the administration capacities. More systemised 
research is needed in this field to evaluate the present institutional design for domestic 
policy coordination. 
In the field of alliance building, Poland’s performance was dramatically improved 855 
by its choice of Sweden as its primary ally for the launch of the Eastern Partnership. 
This meant that the Poles could draw not only on Sweden’s reputation as an ‘honest 
broker’, but also its experience of working in the European institutions. However, as 
this initiative came from the highest political level, it remains to be seen whether the 
lesson has become institutionalized and whether we will witness other successful 860 
alliances in the future, at all levels of decision-making. Poland is only just beginning 
to cultivate allies over a longer term period and it continues to experience difficulties 
in forging alliances with potentially key partners, such as Germany, and even at times 
with the other Visegrád states, where Poland often continues to seek a leadership role 
to the vexation of the others. In the words of one Visegrád country official, ‘other 865 
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Member States might not appreciate it when one of them is trying to put on political 
weight’.43 The other allies that Poland had sought for the Eastern Partnership initially 
were also disappointed to be cast aside without any communication once the Swedish 
choice had been made. Whilst much alliance-forming in the European Union is purely 
ad hoc on an issue-by-issue basis following the British model, those Member States 870 
such as France and Germany that seek to make their mark tend to consider alliance 
building over the very long term. Poland has to decide for itself which model to 
follow. 
Before concluding this article, it is worth making a final observation for future 
research on the nature of the capacity of Member States to exercise power and 875 
influence in the European Union. Future research needs to go beyond Lukes’ second 
dimension of power (persuasion) and develop a framework for investigating the third 
dimension of power (shaping norms and values – i.e. the parameters within which 
debate is framed).44 Although the EU has always, to an extent, been driven by norms 
and values as well as economic imperatives (in the beginning, preventing future 880 
European wars and the consolidating democracy in Europe), since at least the 
Helsinki Final Act of 1975, European governments have become steadily committed 
more to the protection of ever more broadly defined universal ‘human rights’. 
Protection of human rights is often invoked as a means of coercing governments into 
making decisions that they – and sometimes their electorates – would otherwise have 885 
been opposed to.45 It is not unreasonable to suggest that Member States that seek true 
influence in the Union over the long term should set their sights on redefining what is 
normal. In that way, they will be able to shape the future direction of the Union – 
without the Member States or the institutions realising. This is perhaps is how power 
is most effectively exercised in the Union. Empirical studies that map this process 890 
over the longer term, and in particular that chart the newer Member States’ efforts to 
participate in shaping norms, would be a welcome addition to the literature on power 
and influence. 
In sum, the combined success of getting Eastern Partnership on the Council 
agenda at the right moment, finding consensus between the Member States and 895 
winning the backing of the Commission was probably the greatest achievement of 
Polish diplomacy within the EU during its first five years of membership. Our study 
has shown that there was an improvement in Polish performance and the overall 
country’s influence increased after the election of the Civic Platform-led coalition 
government in 2007. It remains to be seen whether this successful experience has 900 
served as a positive lesson learnt and become institutionalized in terms of how Poland 
operates at the European level. Certainly, Poland has sought to keep relations with the 
EU’s Eastern neighbours high on the Union’s political agenda in the subsequent years 
following the first phase of EaP, but the direct influence of Poland on shaping the 
future policy remains to be analysed. 905 
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45 A key example of this is the way that the British government appeared in 2010 to be obliged to give 
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POLAND’S VARIABLE POLITICAL POWER AND INFLUENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
THE CASE OF ITS EASTERN POLICY 
Variable Qualitative Improvement since 2007 
Intensity of Policy Preference No change 
Skill at Alliance Building Improved 
Administrative Capacity No change 
Persuasive Advocacy Improved 
Receptiveness of other Member States Slightly improved 
Domestic Political Strength No change 
Source: Wallace (2005) and authors’ own data. 
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